Introduction
There is evidence in the economic literature that an optimistic bias exists in private expert forecasts of real GDP growth rates, especially near cyclical peaks 3 (Smirnov, 2011 ) also showed that a wishful bias may hamper the ability to recognize the beginning of a recession in real-time. In this paper we refine those ideas and prove them statistically.
In the next section we briefly describe the data. Section 3 formulates and tests several simple hypotheses concerning possible over-optimism in GDP forecasts. Section 4 discusses the main results and offers some concluding remarks.
The Data
The main block of our data consists of consensus (median) forecasts of quarter-to-quarter real GDP growth rates from the Surveys of Professional Forecasters (SPF) conducted by the PhilFed. As we are interested not in individual strategies of different experts but in a possible bias in consensus forecasts, we do not refer to individual estimates. 4 We used all available SPFs which were conducted during the period 1968:Q4-2013:Q4. 5 Hence, there are a total of 181 quarters in our sample; 154 belonging to phases of expansion, and 27 belonging to phases of contraction. There are 7 pairs of cyclical turning points (peaks and troughs) during this time interval.
For each Survey (usually made in the middle of a quarter t we consider five consensus forecasts: one for the current quarter (nowcast f t+0 ) and four for the subsequent quarters (f t+1 , f t+2 , f t+3 , and f t+4 ). Each of these estimates is compared in various manners with actual GDP growth rates 5 In fact, up to 1991:Q4 the PhilFed used GNP instead of GDP. For our purposes this doesn't matter, so -just for the simplicity -we use the term "GDP" everywhere.
(a t+0 , a t+1 , a t+2 , a t+3 , and a t+4 ) also taken from the PhilFed historical database. As an actual we used the first (or advance) GDP estimate published by the BEA. 6 We preferred the first estimate to the last available (as of January 30, 2014) because in the course of 45 years the difference between those two is heavily dependent on changes in the methodology; it is quite clear that nobody could ever keep them in mind while providing regular forecasts.
The SPF set of data is very well known. The novelty of our paper is a deeper examination not only of nowcasts for the current quarter (f t+0 ) and forecasts for one quarter ahead (f t+1 ), but of all five forecasts up to the same quarter of the next year (f t+4 ). 7 In our comparisons we use the NBER set of business cycle turning points (peaks and troughs) in its quarterly version.
Hypotheses and Empirical Results
If f t is an unbiased estimate of a t then the simplest hypothesis assumes that the average difference (D) between a t and f t should not significantly differ from zero:
We may anticipate equation (1) being fulfilled not only for the whole sample but also for subsamples with various time horizons of forecasting (j=0,1,…4). But the figures from Table 1 show that this is not the case. For the whole period 1968:Q4-2013:Q4 our null hypothesis H 0 : D=0 cannot be rejected at ordinary levels of significance only for nowcasts f t+0 and forecasts for one quarter ahead f t+1 . For time horizons of two quarters and more the average actual is significantly less than an average forecast; for one year ahead it is almost 0.9 percentage points less. This is a very significant magnitude not only from a statistical but also from an economic point of view.
Thus, the bias for forecasts f t+2 , f t+3 , f t+4 is positive: on average experts are too optimistic for the future which is far enough ahead. The results for the subsamples for separated periods of expansion and contraction are distinctly different from each other. Nowcasts f t+0 made during expansions are significantly less than actuals (positive difference, excessive caution or excessive pessimism); forecasts for one quarter ahead f t+1 are unbiased, and forecasts for longer time horizons are more than actuals (negative difference, excessive optimism), at least for j=3 and 4. On the other side, forecasts made during periods of contraction are always too optimistic: differences between average actual and forecasted GDP growth rates are always negative, and the magnitude increases as the horizon grows.
Note that all forecasts being pooled for all time horizons are definitely positively biased. The next hypothesis which concerns possible biases in forecasts of GDP growth rates may be written as follows (see Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969) ):
If f t is an unbiased and effective forecast for a t then α=0 and β=1, or
We tested these hypotheses for α and β separately and jointly as well. As there were only a few equations with statistically significant α, we re-estimated equation (2) without constant:
and checked the hypothesis H 0 : β=1.
We also suppose that it is more difficult to make an unbiased forecast at the moment of a cyclical turning point. So, we added two dummies to equations (2) and (3): D p =1 for all peaks and 0 otherwise; and D t =1 for all troughs and 0 otherwise. 8 If we are right, the coefficients of these dummies should be significantly negative for the first (over-optimism) and significantly positive for the second (over-pessimism).
Hence, there are four regressions in our set. We estimated them for the entire period The serious difficulty of predicting recessions in real time may also be easily illustrated by consensus forecasts made just at the quarter of peak. Really, to forecast the end of a recession is much easier than to forecast its beginning. 
Conclusions
We tested consensus (median) forecasts of quarterly GDP growth rates taken from SPF conducted by PhilFed. Usually they may be seen as unbiased only for time horizons j=0,1,2; for greater horizons they are over-optimistic. The over-optimism may also be observed for (j=1, 2) for forecasts made at peaks (at these moments, the consensus usually points only to a slowdown of the US economy but not to a contraction) 9 and for nowcasts (j=0) during cyclical contractions, including two first quarters of a recession (in these cases the reality is usually worse than expected).
Taken together, all these facts mean that some aversion to predicting recessions exists. The second factor is more important because over-pessimism does not occur as often as over-optimism does (if inaccurate extrapolation were the main reason, then some kind of symmetry between over-optimism and over-pessimism while passing the turning points would exist). We found over-pessimism only for nowcasts (j=0) during expansions where it is possibly not overpessimism but over-caution and for forecasts with time horizons j=1, 2 if they are made at troughs.
These latter forecasts are really less than actuals in most cases but usually they are more than zero; so even they point to expansion, not to contraction. Hence, real-time predictions of troughs are usually quite satisfactory.
We strongly believe that a wishful bias exists which prevents experts from predicting recessions properly and in time. To some extent, expert over-optimism or over-pessimism exists at other phases of business cycles, but the inability to predict the beginning of a recession is possibly the most important shortcoming of macroeconomic forecasting. 
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